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A B S T R A C T
Through its focus on state-diaspora relations, existing research has given limited consideration to the role of non-
state entrepreneurial actors in understanding diaspora politicisation. This paper addresses this research gap by
examining the contextually embedded relationship between diaspora politicisation and entrepreneurial activity
within diaspora settlement and homeland spaces. Findings are presented of original qualitative research with
Kurdish diaspora entrepreneurs based in Europe operating in the media and publishing industries. Results de-
monstrate how the intersection between diaspora identity, opportunity frameworks and available resources
generates forms of politicised diaspora entrepreneurship, and how these venture activities contribute to the
transnational (re)production of diaspora identity and the mobilisation of locally rooted diaspora populations.
The implications of these ﬁndings are discussed in relation to enhancing current understanding of diaspora
entrepreneurship and the signiﬁcance of non-state actors within the diaspora politicisation process, and their
relevance to policy thinking across homeland and settlement contexts.
1. Introduction
The role of diasporas inﬂuencing the politics and policies of their
host and home countries has generated a growing body of literature.
Whereas the established role of certain diasporas as political actors is
well documented (Shain & Barth, 2003; Smith, 2000), recent studies
have demonstrated how a wide range of diaspora communities are now
actively engaged in the political process across a range of spatial con-
texts, from democratic states to conﬂict and post-conﬂict zones
(Adamson, 2016; Burgess, 2014; Cohen, 2017; Shain & Barth, 2003;
Smith, 2007). Studies have particularly focused upon the active role of
states in mobilising diasporas (Ho, 2011; Délano & Gamlen, 2014) and
this has often been at the expense of analysis of the practice of non-state
actors. However the political practice of a range of transnational in-
stitutions, entrepreneurs and civil society actors can play a central role
within speciﬁc diaspora contexts, as for example in diasporas generated
through conﬂict situations (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Koinova,
2014).
In seeking to better understand the role of non-state actors in dia-
spora politics, the realm of entrepreneurship and venture activity has
been largely neglected in existing research. An emerging body of re-
search into diaspora entrepreneurs has identiﬁed how they exploit their
strong social networks within diaspora communities and homeland
areas to pursue interests that extend beyond business into the social and
political spheres (Elo, 2016; Gillespie, Riddle, Sayre, & Sturges, 1999;
Nielsen & Riddle, 2010; Riddle, Hrivnak, & Nielsen, 2010). However,
this research has rarely considered how this diaspora entrepreneurship
is distinct from other forms of transnational entrepreneurship, and
critically, how this venture activity relates to the political processes that
(re)create and (re)produce diaspora identity and mobilisation rooted
within the political context of particular host-homeland relations.
It is this gap in our current understanding of the interaction of
diaspora entrepreneurs with processes of diaspora politicisation em-
bedded within settlement localities and diaspora and homeland spaces,
that this paper addresses. By drawing together insights from the in-
ternational relations literature on diaspora politics and agency
(Adamson, 2016; Burgess; 2014; Koinova, 2011) with the business lit-
erature on transnational entrepreneurship (Honig & Drori, 2010; Portes,
Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002; Riddle et al., 2010), the paper focuses upon
the intertwining of political and business action by diaspora en-
trepreneurs operating in transnational channels, to better understand
the motivations and practices of these key non-state actors.
In order to address this neglected area of study we develop the
notion of politicised diaspora entrepreneurship, an original concept
that extends the scope of the existing study of diaspora politics and
entrepreneurship through broadening theoretical and empirical
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.05.008
Received 26 April 2018; Received in revised form 10 April 2019; Accepted 20 May 2019
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: s.syrett@mdx.ac.uk (S. Syrett), J.Keles@mdx.ac.uk (J.Y. Keles).
Political Geography 73 (2019) 60–69
0962-6298/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
understanding of the role of these non-state actors. Embedded within
speciﬁc socio-political contexts characterised by the presence of dif-
ferent actors with diﬀerent objectives and capacities, a fuller under-
standing of the part that business entrepreneurs play in diaspora poli-
ticisation processes enhances understanding of both diaspora
entrepreneurship and diaspora political agency. Speciﬁcally the paper
seeks to answer two questions. What are the processes driving the de-
velopment of forms of politicised diaspora entrepreneurial activity?
And how does such diaspora entrepreneurial activity contribute to the
spatially embedded processes of diaspora politicisation?
To explore the relation between diaspora entrepreneurs, business
development and the (re)production of diaspora identity and mobili-
sation, a contextualised analysis of the particularities of homeland and
host areas in shaping politicisation and business processes is developed.
Here a particular context is considered; that of a conﬂict generated
diaspora lacking a homeland state. For ‘stateless’ diasporas, the absence
of a homeland state is fundamental in shaping the nature of diaspora
politics and the context for entrepreneurial action (Adamson &
Demetriou, 2007; Koinova, 2014). In these contexts, non-state actors
may perform crucial transnational roles in both sustaining conﬂicts as
well as promoting peace and reconstruction and hence are of con-
siderable relevance to policy development (Adamson, 2013; Beyene,
2015; Shain, 2002; Smith and Stares, 2007). Speciﬁcally, this research
focuses upon entrepreneurs from the stateless Kurdish diaspora - one
generated via a series of conﬂict situations within the homeland area
since the 1970s and settled in localities across European states - who
operate in media and publishing industries strongly associated with the
development of diaspora identity and engagement.
This paper starts with a consideration of current theorising of dia-
spora politics, politicisation and diaspora entrepreneurship and their
relationship with particular host-homeland contexts, particularly in
relation to conﬂict generated diasporas. The subsequent sections set out
the study methodology and context before moving on to present results
from original primary data. Analysis of in depth interviews with
Kurdish entrepreneurs, purposively selected due to their simultaneous
political engagement and development of publishing and media busi-
ness ventures, identiﬁes key factors driving the emergence and devel-
opment of diﬀerent forms of politicised entrepreneurship. The conclu-
sion of the paper considers the implications of the notion of politicised
diaspora entrepreneurship for current conceptions of diaspora en-
trepreneurship and understanding the signiﬁcance of non-state actors
within the politicisation process, as well as for future research agendas
and policy development.
2. Politicising diasporas, entrepreneurial action and space
The large scale and complex migrant ﬂows of recent decades have
resulted in the presence of numerous diaspora communities globally,
each characterised by multiple linkages between settlement and
homeland areas and constituted within a wider transnational space.
Adamson and Demetriou (2007: 497) state that: “A diaspora can be
identiﬁed as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that
has succeeded over time to: (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or
religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties
with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address
the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a
developed internal organisational framework and transnational links”.
Building on this deﬁnition, recent scholarship has demonstrated how
diasporas are constantly being created, recreated and actively con-
structed in terms of their identities and their organisations and linkages
(Abramson, 2017; Adamson, 2013; Christou & Mavroudi, 2015;
McConnell, 2013). This processual view of diaspora development
militates against considering diasporas as ﬁxed, homogeneous entities,
instead recognising they are routinely comprised of varied and indeed
competing groups, and that coming from a certain country of ancestral
origin does not automatically confer diaspora membership.
Understanding of what constitutes a diaspora also recognises the
spatially embedded nature of diaspora identities, linkages and institu-
tions that are developed across places of settlement and identiﬁcation
with a real or imagined homeland. The construction of diaspora col-
lective identiﬁcation is rooted in a narrative of dispersion from a
homeland, shared memories and myths, and a homeland attachment
that exists beyond borders (Brah, 1996; Brubaker, 2005; Safran, 1991).
Although physically rooted in speciﬁc territories and places, diasporas
are able to sustain a sense of collective identiﬁcation across and beyond
localities which is not dependent on homeland return (Georgiou, 2006).
At the same time, diaspora identiﬁcation co-exists with other senses of
identity related to areas of settlement, often in complex ways (Smith,
2003; Staeheli, Ehrkamp, Leitner, & Nagel, 2012).
2.1. Diasporas politics and politicisation
Although initially in academic analysis diaspora communities were
often portrayed as victims or passive actors, it has become recognised
that membership of a diaspora implies potential empowerment, based
on its capacity to mobilise support and inﬂuence across settlement,
homeland and global space (Butler, 2001; Cohen, 2008). The agency of
diasporas to eﬀect political change is well evidenced across a variety of
democratic and non-democratic contexts (Koinova, 2011; Smith, 2007;
Vertovec, 2005). Studies have demonstrated how diasporas play an
increasing role in homeland politics (Ahmadov & Sasse, 2016; Burgess,
2014; Kapur, 2010) and are often directly involved in high proﬁle
conﬂicts, peace building and campaigns for homeland recognition of
stateless groups (Demmers, 2007; Fair, 2005; Koinova, 2014). Central
to this process has been the ever-widening availability of communica-
tions technologies, enabling cheap and routine connectivity within the
diaspora across host and homeland spaces (Keles, 2016).
Study of the process of diaspora politicisation increasingly re-
cognises the importance of the spatially embedded interaction between
the dimensions of diaspora identity and diaspora engagement/mobili-
sation (Abramson, 2017; Fischer, 2017; Van Hear & Cohen, 2017).
Diaspora identity, engagement and mobilisation are politically con-
stituted through a complex interrelation between a homeland area
(both real and imagined) and multiple dispersed places, located in
distinct settlement contexts (Demmers, 2007; Guarnizo, Portes, &
Haller, 2003). Together these form a wider diaspora space in, and
through which, host-homeland interactions take place, with a diaspora's
political claims often developed in a larger transnational context
(Ahmadov & Sasse, 2016; Lyons & Mandaville, 2012).
Research into the political processes of diaspora engagement and
mobilisation has tended to centre upon state-centred channels and
mechanisms (Délano & Gamlen, 2014). Such research has explored
processes of lobbying and other political actions inﬂuencing host state
foreign policies, and homeland state engagement practices aimed at
accessing the skills and resources of diaspora communities or embra-
cing members back into the homeland state political system (Collyer,
2014; Gamlen, Cummings, Vaaler, & Rossouw, 2013; Ragazzi, 2014).
Yet much current theorising has failed to set out how the causal pro-
cesses for diaspora politicisation are jointly aﬀected by conditions in
the homeland and settlement localities, and state-centred approaches
on their own remain unable to explain variant patterns of diaspora
mobilisation across all host-homeland contexts, as Koinova (2014) has
demonstrated in relation to conﬂict generated diasporas.
2.2. Non-state actors and diaspora entrepreneurs
To understand diaspora politicisation fully requires consideration of
the role of ‘non-state’ actors and institutions operating through trans-
national channels to engage and mobilise diaspora communities.
Beyond the nation state an array of civil society, religious and business
sector actors and institutions operate transnationally to inﬂuence the
nature and scale of diaspora social exchanges (Faist, 2008; Vertovec,
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2009), yet the study of their role in diaspora politicisation remains
underdeveloped. Some research has considered the role played by
diaspora organisations in constructing diaspora identities, building
communities and acting as mediators between locations, people and
institutions (Fischer, 2017; Van Gorp & Smets, 2015). Other studies
have identiﬁed the important role of individual, non-state, diaspora
activists; that is those who make claims on behalf of their original
homelands and act in response to global and local opportunity struc-
tures (Adamson, 2013; Koinova, 2014; Smith & Stares, 2007). Here the
term ‘political entrepreneur’ has been applied (Adamson & Demetriou,
2007; Koinova, 2014), although the notion of the ‘entrepreneur’ is used
in its generic sense, relating to individuals who exhibit qualities of
action orientation and opportunity recognition, and not in the speciﬁc
sense of individuals pursuing business venturing activity.
Within the business literature, the term diaspora entrepreneurship is
seen as a particular form of the wider phenomenon of transnational
entrepreneurship. The notion of transnational entrepreneurship relates
to entrepreneurs with multiple aﬃliations to cultures and places rea-
lising opportunities arising from increased economic globalisation and
cross-border activities (Drori, Honig, & Wright, 2009; Honig & Drori,
2010; Morawska, 2004). Transnational entrepreneurs operate in com-
plex cross-national domains with dual cultural, institutions and eco-
nomic features, which enable entrepreneurial strategies that seek to
exploit business opportunities in both host and homeland areas (Drori,
Honig, & Ginsberg, 2010). Within this wider focus upon transnational
entrepreneurs, Riddle et al. (2010: 398) deﬁne diaspora entrepreneurs
as: “migrants and their descendants who establish entrepreneurial ac-
tivities that span the national business environments of their countries
of origin and countries of residence”. The emphasis here is upon the
important role diaspora entrepreneurs and communities can play in
shaping transnational ﬂows of capital, commodities, labour, knowledge
and business activities (Portes et al., 2002; Riddle et al., 2010).
Study of transnational diaspora entrepreneurship has demonstrated
how high trust relations and shared social norms enable economic
linkages and reduce transaction costs (Yeung, 2004), whilst diaspora
networks provide varying levels of resources, cross border knowledge
and information, and market opportunities (Kitching, Smallbone, &
Athayde, 2009; Riddle & Brinkerhoﬀ, 2011; Sepulveda, Syrett, & Lyon,
2010; Terjesen & Elam, 2009). Existing studies have also examined the
economic and social development consequences of homeland states
political mobilisation of transnational diaspora economic resources and
entrepreneurial activity (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2016). These studies have centred
upon processes mobilising ﬁnancial resources in relation to migrant
remittances, foreign investment and humanitarian aid, as well as pro-
moting entrepreneurial activity, skilled labour migration and the wider
establishment of liberal market economic activities (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2008;
Ionescu, 2006; Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006; Newland & Tanaka, 2010;
Syrett & Sepulveda, 2011).
However studies of diaspora entrepreneurship (e.g. Elo, 2016;
Riddle et al., 2010; Sharma & Montes, 2013) have to date largely failed
to specify how it is distinct from other forms of transnational en-
trepreneurship and critically, how it relates to the particularities of
what constitutes a diaspora. Research has demonstrated that diaspora
entrepreneurs display diﬀerent motivations and practices in that they
invest in their countries of origin for more than just pecuniary reasons
(Brinkerhoﬀ, 2016; Gillespie et al., 1999; Nielsen & Riddle, 2010;
Riddle et al., 2010). However, these studies have not explored in detail
the reasons for this, and speciﬁcally how these diﬀerences in en-
trepreneurial practice relate to membership of a social collectivity that
exists across state borders to sustain both a particular identity and an
ability to address collective interests. An understanding of diaspora
development that emphasises the constant (re)creation and construc-
tion of diaspora identities, linkages and organisational forms, requires
that diaspora entrepreneurship is understood in relation to these on-
going processes.
This failure to conceptualise diaspora entrepreneurship in these
terms explains why the relationship between entrepreneurial activity
and processes of diaspora politicisation has remained largely un-
explored. Furthermore, despite recognition that diaspora entrepreneurs
operate within complex cross-national domains, only limited attention
has been given to the broader political context within which such ac-
tivities are embedded. Yet the political context matters. The nature and
extent of transnational linkages, both formal and informal, and the
opportunities provided for engagement between diaspora communities
and homeland areas are shaped by a range of factors related to the
particularities of host-homeland contexts (Ahmadov & Sasse, 2016;
Guarnizo et al., 2003; Kapur, 2010). Politicised identities are largely
developed within places of settlement (Cliﬀord, 1994). In liberal de-
mocratic countries, diaspora communities can beneﬁt from recognition
of multicultural rights that allows the pursuit of ethnic identities and
homeland-oriented claims, whilst their degree of inclusion/exclusion
within host communities inﬂuences the nature and extent of homeland
orientation (Burgess, 2014; Demmers, 2007).
2.3. The political context of conﬂict generated diasporas
The importance of political context is especially apparent in the case
of conﬂict generated diasporas, where the particularities of homeland
and host contexts are strongly apparent in driving the diaspora politi-
cisation process (Adamson, 2013; Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Smith
& Stares, 2007). In these contexts of struggle and conﬂict, highly po-
liticised identities frequently emerge and become consolidated
(Demmers, 2007; Lyon & Uçarer, 2001), playing important roles in
spreading as well as moderating conﬂict situations (Kaldor-Robinson,
2002).
Central to the politicisation of collective identiﬁcation in relation to
conﬂict generated diasporas is shared trauma resulting from episodes of
persecution, conﬂict and displacement, accompanied by strong feelings
of guilt and/or shame for leaving or ‘abandoning’ the homeland
(Koinova, 2016a; Ramanathapillai, 2006). The resulting shared his-
tories provide an associated collective sense of responsibility and moral
obligation for action to improve homeland conditions (Eyerman, 2004;
Koinova, 2011) and a source of resentment and anger that drives po-
litical action to redress past wrongs (Alexander, 2004; Vollhardt, 2009).
For conﬂict generated diaspora communities settled in liberal de-
mocratic states, processes of political engagement and mobilisation are
realised through both state based and other transnational channels
(Koinova, 2014, 2016b). However in relation to homeland engagement,
conﬂict generated diasporas display quite diﬀerent characteristics of
governmentality, particularly where the diaspora lacks its own home-
land state. Volatile homeland central and subnational states exhibit
competition for institutional control (Raleigh & Linke, 2018), often
creating active hostility to elements of ‘stateless’ diaspora communities
in settlement countries. In such situations, as Adamson and Demetriou
(2007: 505) argue, it is “non-state political entrepreneurs” rather than
state political elites, who are central to the construction of diaspora
identity and transnational practice. Where state engagement policies
are absent, ineﬀective or hostile to diaspora communities, business
entrepreneurs can play an inﬂuential role in mobilisation and identity
development, using the human, ﬁnancial and social capital they mo-
bilise and exploit transnationally for business purposes, for political
ones too.
To date there has been no in depth study of these politicised dia-
spora entrepreneurs, the term we use here to draw together and extend
understanding of the ‘political entrepreneur’ and the ‘diaspora en-
trepreneur’ within the existing academic literature. The rest of this
paper addresses the interrelationship between transnational diaspora
entrepreneurs and processes of political engagement, mobilisation and
identity formation within a particular context; that of a conﬂict gen-
erated, stateless diaspora. Through developing the notion of the poli-
ticised diaspora entrepreneur, we seek to capture and explore the
practice of those entrepreneurs who are operating in transnational
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channels in the pursuit of both economic and political objectives within
a given diaspora context. In so doing, we aim to extend existing con-
ceptualisation of diaspora entrepreneurship, and develop our under-
standing of the signiﬁcant role of non-state actors in processes of dia-
spora politicisation.
3. Research method
The embedded nature of the relation between diaspora en-
trepreneurial practice and politicisation processes requires a con-
textually informed understanding of action rooted within a diaspora
space constituted by multiple places across settlement and homeland
areas. The focus of study are entrepreneurs who form part of the
Kurdish diaspora settled in Europe, and operate in the media and
publishing sector. The Kurdish diaspora is a ‘stateless’ one, with an
ongoing history of political struggle in the absence of a homeland state,
and a well-established set of diverse diaspora communities within
Europe as well as globally, which display a degree of common experi-
ence and established political and economic links. The media and
publishing industries provides a particularly insightful context for ex-
ploring the relationship between processes of diaspora politicisation
and entrepreneurial practice. The ongoing growth of diverse media and
communication related businesses that facilitate routine and everyday
knowledge exchange across diaspora space, play a highly inﬂuential
role in diaspora mobilisation and the construction of diaspora identity.
The research method comprised two elements. First an analysis of
existing secondary sources to understand the politicisation of the
Kurdish diaspora and the development of media and publishing in-
dustries within the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and their relationship
with state authorities in homeland and settlement areas. Second, in
depth qualitative study of the actions of a select number of politically
engaged Kurdish entrepreneurs operating within the media and pub-
lishing sector, active across settlement places in Europe and their
homeland areas. The focus upon the entrepreneur provided the op-
portunity to examine their role as key non-state political actors.
Primary research comprised a ﬁrst phase of identifying and conducting
initial discussions with Kurdish entrepreneurs operating across Europe,
in Sweden, Germany and the UK, and Kurdistan, in order to gain an
understanding of diﬀerences between settlement contexts. This was
followed by a second phase comprising a series of in depth interviews
with nine politically engaged Kurdish entrepreneurs identiﬁed through
known gatekeepers and a process of snowballing within Kurdish com-
munities across Europe.
Participating entrepreneurs were purposively selected on the basis
of their involvement in the setting up and running of business ventures
in the media and publishing sector and their political engagement. Key
characteristics of these entrepreneurs are set out in Table 1. Re-
spondents comprised eight men and one woman, a consequence of the
low number of women entrepreneurs operating within the sector. They
were aged between 36 and 56, reﬂecting that participants had estab-
lished business ventures and political careers. The entrepreneurs were
predominantly educated to university degree level and a number had
active links within the intellectual Kurdish diaspora class. The majority
originated from Kurdistan-Turkey with two respondents from Kurdi-
stan-Iraq. Most were long term residents of over 20 years in Germany,
the UK and Sweden, although three had settled more recently.
A major challenge of this research was to gain access to research
subjects. At the time the research was conducted (2016–2017), the
Kurdish homeland context was highly politicised as a result of the war
against the Islamic State, human rights abuses in the Kurdistan Region
of Turkey, and political developments in Kurdistan-Iraqi and the
Kurdistan Region of Syria. Kurdish entrepreneurs were highly suspi-
cious of researchers due to reports of the Turkish state using so-called
“researchers” or “journalists” to collect information about opposition
ﬁgures living in Europe (Guardian, 2017). As a result, those involved in
the re-production of alternative political opinions were extremely
cautious over who they would speak to. The sensitivity of the topic area
required building trust-based relationships with entrepreneurs over
time in order for them to agree to participate in the research and ne-
cessitated focus on a small number of in depth cases. Those interviewed
were involved in broader Kurdish diaspora politics but not directly in
party politics. Research participants were fully informed about the
purpose, methods and intended uses of the research for academic
publication. Procedures were adopted to ensure conﬁdentiality, which
included the use of pseudonyms and the anonymisation of data. Inter-
views were conducted in Kurdish and recorded by hand rather than
tape recorded, and subsequently translated into English.
The semi-structured interview schedule gathered data on the en-
trepreneur, their business activities and political engagement, and how
their political and business activities developed over time. Interview
transcripts were analysed to capture the key factors that had driven
their development of entrepreneurial activity and its relation to their
particular engagement with the development of a collective form of
Kurdish identity and diaspora politics. Qualitative analysis involved the
development of a coding guide to facilitate cross-case thematic analysis
of the transcripts of the nine entrepreneurs. The initially identiﬁed
parent nodes were then consolidated into three key themes in a second
stage of analysis. All data were coded by two researchers to ensure
reliability and consistency. Interview data were supplemented with
data gathered through interviews with a number of key informants
within the various Kurdish communities. These data were used to en-
sure a full understanding of the local context, conﬁrm the main themes
identiﬁed, and triangulate research ﬁndings.
4. Kurdish diaspora politicisation and the media and publishing
industries
The homeland area of Kurdistan is situated within the national
jurisdictions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and is home to an estimated
35 million Kurds. The ethno-centric nation-building projects pursued in
these four nation states have routinely denied the Kurds their identity,
culture, homeland and political representation, often via force of arms.
Table 1
Entrepreneur characteristics.
Entrepreneur (Gender/Age) Country of Origin Education Settlement country/Length of
residency
Type of business venture
Zana (male/56 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University degree Germany/1 year Newspaper & TV station
Adar (male/56 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University degree Germany/22 years Publisher
Sanar (male/44 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University degree Germany/23 years TV production & monthly local magazine
Roni (male/41 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University degree UK/28 years Community radio & newspaper; think-tanks; food
industry
Solin (female/45 years) Kurdistan-Iraq University degree UK/21 years Online magazine and quarterly journal
Baran (male/37 years) Kurdistan-Turkey Further Education College UK/6 year Weekly local newspaper
Alan (male/45 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University study UK/2 years Radio station, magazine & advertising agency
Shwan (male/36 years) Kurdistan-Iraq University degree/PhD UK/26 years Radio station
Azad (male/55 years) Kurdistan-Turkey University degree Sweden/35 years Publishing & printing
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The subsequent instability in the region has generated mass displace-
ment and refugee ﬂows (Keles, 2015; Vali, 1998).
Although large scale Kurdish immigration to Europe started in the
1960s in the form of work migration from the Kurdish region of Turkey
(Keles, 2015), subsequent Kurdish migration has been predominantly
generated by discrimination, persecution and war in the wider con-
tested territory of Kurdistan. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the
intensive war between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) created a signiﬁcant Kurdish inﬂux into Europe. Further
major ﬂows of Kurdish migrants to Europe came from Iraq, as result of
displacement and mass killing of Kurds, and the suppression of Kurdish
armed insurrections in Iraq and Turkey (van Bruinessen, 2000). To-
gether with refugee ﬂows from Iran and most recently Syria, these
varied migrations have created a large and diverse Kurdish diaspora in
Europe. However the statelessness of Kurds has led to their relative
invisibility oﬃcially within settlement countries (Holgate, Keles, &
Kumarappan, 2012; King, Thomson, Mai, & Keles, 2008). In the absence
of reliable statistical information, the total European Kurdish popula-
tion is estimated at over 1.5 million, with the majority from the Kur-
distan Region of Turkey, and the largest settlement populations in
Germany, the UK, Sweden and France.
As political conﬂict and discrimination in homeland areas has
continued, the majority of this Kurdish diaspora has abandoned plans
for return. In this context, politicisation has been driven by the con-
struction of a collective Kurdish identity across the diaspora and an
increased orientation and engagement with the homeland, enabled by
communication technologies and the development of diaspora institu-
tions and networks. As van Bruinessen (2000: 2) notes: “It was exile
that transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely deﬁned geographical entity
into a political ideal”. The arrival of a growing number of refugee
Kurdish intellectuals from the 1970s led to the formation of associations
and networks across Europe. The intensiﬁcation of the war between the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish state led to the spread
of the conﬂict to Europe and heightened politicisation within the
Kurdish diaspora (Curtis, 2005; Keles, 2015; van Bruinessen, 1999).
This process was further strengthened by the Saddam regime's attacks
on the Kurds in Kurdistan-Iraq, and subsequent ISIS attacks on Kurdish
Yezidis and Kurds in Rojava/Syria. The result of these varied conﬂict
situations are diverse diaspora communities and competing inﬂuences
upon the transnational construction of Kurdish diaspora identities.
The combination of ongoing conﬂict situations and a condition of
statelessness, has consistently constrained possibilities for institutional
access through state channels to homeland areas. In consequence, non-
state actors and institutions have been the primary drivers for the
production of a collective Kurdish identity and provided the transna-
tional channels for increased mobilisation. The Kurdish intellectual
refugee population played a key role in the renaissance of Kurdish
cultural production that spread to other parts of the Kurdish diaspora
and back to homeland areas (Institut-Kurde de Paris, 2002; Izady,
1992); a process enabled by liberal policies in Western settlement
countries. Kurdish diaspora communities have increasingly become the
voice for the Kurds; lobbying for their homeland, increasing interna-
tional awareness of the Kurdistan question, and providing ﬁnancial
support for various Kurdish humanitarian, cultural and political orga-
nisations.
The emergence of a range of Kurdish owned media, publishing and
communication enterprises across Europe has played a crucial role in
the construction of collective Kurdish identities through the production
of language, culture and news, to counter the hegemonic state dis-
courses in their occupied homeland, and providing transnational
channels for engagement and mobilisation (Keles, 2015; Romano, 2002;
Sheyholislami, 2011). Initial development in the 1970s centred upon
the emergence of a number of book and newspaper publishing ventures,
ﬁrst in Sweden, with the creation of a Kurdistan Press newspaper and a
number of Kurdish publishing houses (Firat, Nudem, Welat, Reya Teze,
Roja Nu and APEC) with more developing subsequently in Berlin in the
1990s. Publication of the Kurdish newspaper Özgür Politika (Free Poli-
tics) started in Germany following bombings of its Istanbul oﬃces in
1994, and the Kurdish daily newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika has been
published here since 2006.
Hassanpour (1998: 53) noted how the ﬁrst Kurdish language TV
channel (MED TV), launched in 1995 in London and Brussels, trans-
cended: “the international borders which since 1918 have divided the land
in which Kurds live. The channel allowed the Kurds, for the ﬁrst time in their
history, to establish a powerful mode of communication among themselves,
and undermine the state-centred geopolitical order that has reduced them to
the status of helpless minorities.”MED TV subsequently evolved through a
number of incarnations across diﬀerent European countries (UK, Bel-
gium, France, Denmark) and new Kurdish TV channels have subse-
quently been established by the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, with ten
transnational channels currently operating across the cultural, political
and religious spectrum. Recent years have seen the development of new
digital media, communication and IT industries, including the devel-
opment of the ﬁrst Kurdish language search engine, started in 2014 by a
Swedish based Kurdish entrepreneur.
The creation and development of many of these media businesses
has often been a highly politicised process in the face of active con-
testation by homeland and sometimes host state authorities. For ex-
ample there have been consistent attempts to restrict Kurdish TV
broadcasting by the Turkish state both within Turkey as well as in
settlement countries, with the result that broadcasting licenses for
certain Kurdish TV channels have been revoked in a number of
European states on the basis of stated security fears.
5. Understanding the development of politicised diaspora
entrepreneurship
To understand the evolving practice of diaspora entrepreneurs
across place and space, in depth research centred on nine Kurdish en-
trepreneurs based in Germany, Sweden and the UK. A brief proﬁle of
the respondents as business entrepreneurs and political activists is set
out in Table 2. All had business ventures in the media and publishing
sector and were politically engaged, although the nature and extent of
this engagement varied. All enterprises operated transnationally across
places of settlement, the wider diaspora space and homeland areas,
albeit again to varying degrees. Business ventures were predominantly
created initially to serve either the Kurdish market within the settle-
ment context and/or the wider Kurdish diaspora communities settled
across European states (e.g. Germany, Sweden, UK, Netherlands,
France, Belgium). From this base, a number expanded to serve home-
land populations in Kurdistan when circumstances allowed. However,
the TV station and newspaper business set up by Zana and his collea-
gues was from the outset created to serve homeland and diaspora
communities, and the radio station launched by Shwan was developed
to broadcast in Iraqi-Kurdistan.
To understand the processes driving politicised diaspora en-
trepreneurial activity, interview analysis identiﬁed three key themes: a
developing politicised diaspora identity, resource availability and op-
portunity frameworks across host-homeland areas. Within the speciﬁc
context of enterprises operating within the media and publishing sector,
the presence and interplay between these three elements was crucial in
understanding how and why entwined entrepreneurial and political
practice emerged and developed, and how this contributed to processes
of diaspora identity construction, engagement and mobilisation.
5.1. Politicised diaspora identity
Central to understanding the development of these actors’ en-
trepreneurial activities was the nature of their evolving politicised
identities within the Kurdish diaspora. Pre-migration political engage-
ment and traumatic experiences of repression and conﬂict were fun-
damental in shaping these entrepreneurs personal political identities
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and motivations. In six of the cases, individuals had ﬂed their home in
Kurdistan-Turkey and Iraq due to their experiences of direct state per-
secution as a result of their involvement in political activity across a
period ranging from the 1970s to the time of study in 2016/17. In other
cases, respondents had moved as children with their families ﬂeeing
direct political persecution as part of a family re-union. Common per-
sonal experiences of trauma, displacement and becoming a political
exile and part of developing diaspora networks, fostered strong shared
emotions. These, combined with an emergent sense of common iden-
tiﬁcation with a Kurdish homeland and culture rooted in the absence of
their own Kurdish state, together provided the basis for a developing
group consciousness. In addition the entrepreneurs reported a sense of
obligation and responsibility to act given their relative freedom to do
so, which translated politically into active support for promoting
Kurdish identity and culture, both across the wider diaspora space and
their homeland region.
This political commitment manifested itself through two inter-
related ﬁelds of entrepreneurial action; that of support for the pre-
servation and promotion of Kurdish culture and language, and the
dissemination of knowledge, information, news and debate about the
Kurdish condition. A number of the entrepreneurial ventures were
committed to the advancement of Kurdish culture, and particularly the
Kurdish language. Adar, for example, had through his German based
publishing house published over 300 books on Kurdish literature, lan-
guage and culture, selling these across the diaspora in Europe as well as
to universities in the Kurdistan regions of Turkey and Iraq. These
ventures not only served business interests but were also conceived of
as a political act; one which sought to ﬁght against the persecution of
the Kurds in homeland areas, and promote the idea of creating a
homeland Kurdish state. As Adar stated:
“Our reproduction of the Kurdish culture can be interpreted as a political
and patriotic position and a response against those countries which deny
the Kurdish existence and their self-determination and language.”
And Azad, who runs a publishing business in Sweden, expressed a
similar sentiment:
“The culture we produce is a political stance against those who forbid our
language. It was impossible to produce Kurdish culture in our own
country. Our language is still banned by the Turkish state”
This strong commitment evident to Kurdish language and literature
as central to the Kurdish identity reﬂected the background and social
position of a number of these entrepreneurs. As university educated
refugees, a number of whom formed part of the wider Kurdish refugee
intellectual community, a strong, shared commitment was evident in
recognising the importance of language, literature and the ability to
express ideas as central to notions of Kurdish identity, as well as the
need to pass this on to subsequent generations:
“If the Kurdish language disappears, the idea of establishing a Kurdish
state will die too. The idea of having a state closely depends on the ex-
istence of a language. Therefore we spend our money and time to keep
our language alive”
For some respondents, their political mission went beyond just
promoting the Kurdish language, and extended to pursuing its critical
development. The case of Solin exempliﬁes this position, with her
viewing her feminist magazine ventures as providing a platform to
address prevailing patriarchy and sexism within Kurdish culture.
The second interrelated element of politicised entrepreneurial
practice was a commitment to providing up to date news and in-
formation on the condition of Kurds both within homeland areas as well
as within the places of settlement, through newspapers, magazines,
websites and television channels. Critical here was an identiﬁed need to
counter the dominant discourses arising from the states in the home-
land areas (Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran), to present a Kurdish viewpoint
and ‘worldview’. Although the principal audience was Kurdish popu-
lations in host and homeland areas, these ventures also served to inform
non-Kurdish media and political audiences in settlement countries and
homeland states, to advance the ongoing struggle for greater political
recognition. Baran, whose digital version of his weekly newspaper
provides up to date news on political developments to audiences in
Turkey/Kurdistan, noted:
“The Kurdish media and TV channels have been shut down by the
Turkish government again. Journalists are arrested. In this context, we
do not only provide news to the Kurdish diaspora, but we inform the
Kurdish people in Kurdistan via the internet from the Kurdish perspec-
tive.”
Zana, who runs a TV and newspaper venture in Germany, set out a
similar commitment, albeit one that looked beyond serving only Kurds:
“we provide objective news to the peoples of Turkey including the Kurds
… to create an intellectual discussion platform for writers and columnists
with the diﬀerent political backgrounds to contribute to the struggle for
peace and democracy in Turkey”.
Across the entrepreneurs, a political commitment to action was
apparent that was actively producing politicised identities, which
shaped, and were in turn shaped by, their business practice. Complex,
multiple identities were evident here. These reﬂected the personalities,
political and ideological positions and experiences of individual actors
from diﬀerent part of Kurdistan, as well as the particular histories and
geographies of diﬀerent host and homeland communities and their
generational and gendered experiences. Multiple identities, political
positions and aspirations were informed by a common political com-
mitment to Kurdish culture and identity and enhancing knowledge of
the condition of Kurdish communities. Yet whilst for some their
common political identity was strongly ethnically focused, and linked
to the creation of a homeland Kurdish state, for others it was more
Table 2
Entrepreneur Proﬁles.
Zana was imprisoned for his political activities and was a founding member of a
Kurdish political party and cultural foundation He moved to Germany in 2017
and co-founded an internet based newspaper and TV company for Turkish and
diaspora audiences to oppose the Turkish government.
Shwan came to the UK in 1991 at 10 years old following attacks on Kurds by the
Saddam Hussein regime. Qualiﬁed as a technology engineer, in 2009 he started
an English language radio station in Kurdistan-Iraq for an audience of returnees,
young people and international workers.
Azad was involved in Kurdish political movements in Turkey in the 1970s and
became a refugee to Sweden in 1982 after the declaration of martial law. He
established a publishing and printing business in Sweden in 1987, and in 2012 a
publishing house in Kurdistan/Turkey.
Baran left Turkey to settle in the UK in 2008 following political persecution. He
became a publisher of a weekly Kurdish and Turkish local newspaper that
circulates in London and other UK cities, plus a digital version read in Kurdistan/
Turkey.
Sanar was arrested due to his political activism in Turkey and moved to Germany in
1994. He worked for a range of Kurdish based media organisations before
launching a monthly cultural magazine in Kurdish and German in 2015, whilst
also producing TV programmes for Kurdish TV stations.
Solin came to the UK in 1996 from Kurdistan-Iraq following the civil war where she
had a leadership position within the Iraqi Communist Party. In London, she
created an online feminist, cultural and political magazine in Kurdish and English
and a quarterly journal published in Kurdistan-Iraq.
Alan was the local chairperson for the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)
when he moved to the UK in 2016. Here he re-launched his advertising agency to
operate between Istanbul and London and created a Kurdish radio station and,
leftist oriented Kurdish magazine.
Adar became involved in the Kurdish political movement in Turkey following the
1991 attacks on Kurds by the Saddam Hussein regime. Forced to leave, he moved
to Germany in 1995 where he founded a printing business in 2002, and later two
publishing houses.
Roni arrived in London with his family in 1989 as a refugee aged 14. Roni's various
entrepreneurial ventures include a community radio and newspaper, think-tank
organisations and restaurants used to cross ﬁnance these other ventures.
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outward looking, seeking to engage Kurdish self-determination with
wider political socialist or liberal agendas. These contrasting political
projects were reﬂected in the nature of their business operations.
Shwan, through his radio station within Iraqi-Kurdistan, broadcasted
programming supportive of a liberal, pluralist political agenda. In the
UK, Roni's think-tank organisations brought together diverse stake-
holders to discuss Kurdish issues and seek to develop common posi-
tions, whilst Solin's feminist journal and online magazine provided a
bridge between diaspora and homeland activists to challenge the ex-
isting patriarchal status quo within Kurdish society.
The cases of these politicised entrepreneurs demonstrated how the
operation of their media and publishing ventures provided a me-
chanism for constructing collective identities and a means of political
engagement and mobilisation, both transnationally and locally within
settlement communities in Sweden, Germany and the UK. Through
their ventures, these entrepreneurs have played a signiﬁcant role in
constructing a collective Kurdish identiﬁcation across European dia-
spora communities and homeland areas, by strengthening the use of the
Kurdish language, celebrating Kurdish culture and developing a shared
historical narrative and worldview. Simultaneously they have provided
vital channels to communicate and develop this identity and engage
diaspora communities locally as well as transnationally, using social
networks and mobilising human and ﬁnancial resources to identify and
pursue opportunities for action.
5.2. Available resources of human, social and ﬁnancial capital
The entrepreneurs’ pursuit of their business and political activities
was reliant on their ability to draw upon a mix of human, social and
ﬁnancial capital. Fundamental to the development of all these ventures
was the availability of highly qualiﬁed and culturally active human
capital. The entrepreneurs themselves were characterised by their high
level of education, quite distinct from many other Kurdish immigrant
entrepreneurs, and their links to an educated class within the Kurdish
diaspora. As a result, their businesses were able to draw upon the
presence of a highly educated workforce, either locally or across the
diaspora, to develop media and publishing activities requiring high-
level language and writing skills. Commitment to a shared political
position meant members of the diaspora were willing to contribute
their skills on a voluntary basis. As Azad, pointed out with regard to his
book publishing venture:
“I think we have built up strong human capital in our community in
Sweden … Four Kurdish teachers and writers help me on a voluntary
basis to translate and proofread the books we published in Kurdish. They
have spent their lives, like myself, contributing to the reproduction and
development of the Kurdish culture, language and literature.”
The presence of diﬀerent forms of social capital was fundamental to
the creation and subsequent development of all these entrepreneurial
ventures. Shared histories of oppression provided strong bonding social
capital between displaced individuals, and eﬀective business operation
frequently required the presence of high trust relations in the face of
hostility from homeland states. Notably all the business ventures built
upon a variety of existing political, social and business related social
networks. The network of an intellectual political refugee class was
central to supporting Azad and Adar's respective Swedish and German
book publishing ventures. In the cases of Baran's newspaper and Alan's
radio businesses, these built directly upon their extensive political and
economic networks across Kurdish diaspora community organisations
and entrepreneurs in the UK and beyond. To launch his radio station,
Shwan mobilised networks of returnees to Iraqi-Kurdistan, and Zana
used networks created through involvement in a pro-Kurdish political
party in the Turkish Parliament and left-oriented social organisations in
Turkey, to develop his TV and newspaper ventures. These business
activities also actively fed into an ongoing process of political net-
working, as exempliﬁed by the inﬂuential think-tanks set-up by Roni in
London, which became key centres of interaction between British,
Kurdish and Turkish political actors concerned with Turkey and
Kurdistan relations.
The ﬁnancing of these ventures drew principally upon ﬁnancial
resources within the diaspora settlement communities. A number of the
entrepreneur's media businesses were ﬁnanced through advertising
revenue largely derived from other businesses within the Kurdish dia-
spora, as was the case for Zana, Sanar and Baran's enterprises. However,
the markets they served were of growing interest to non-Kurdish busi-
nesses and organisations too, as Sanar observed:
“Generally, this type of business relies on their ethnic group. However, we
also receive advertisements from non-Kurdish businesses and even from
the political parties during the election campaigns. For example, the
German Left (die Linke) advertised its election manifesto in our magazine
to reach Kurdish-German citizens in Berlin”.
Evident in a number of the entrepreneur's business models was a
degree of cross-subsidisation from voluntary support, donations, or
their other more ﬁnancially viable business ventures. Roni, for example,
used his large and proﬁtable restaurant and café businesses in London
to support his community newspaper business and think-tank organi-
sations, while Alan used his London/Istanbul based advertising agency
to ﬁnance his Kurdish Radio station in the UK to: “continue our struggle
in and from the diaspora”. Similarly, Azad's printing business in Sweden
supported the activities of his publishing house, which produces books
of limited revenue generating potential, and has enabled him on oc-
casions to distribute books free of charge to reach target markets in
homeland areas. Access to a committed volunteer workforce was crucial
to the viability of many of these businesses. Zana's newspaper and TV
company in Germany drew upon over 40 commentators and columnists
who provided unpaid contributions in addition to the core staﬀ of 30. A
number of businesses had also beneﬁted from donations from other
business owners and members of the diaspora supportive of their pro-
motion of Kurdish culture, news and information.
The resources of human, social and ﬁnancial capital which enabled
these entrepreneurs to pursue their media and publishing ventures were
primarily rooted within the diaspora and mobilised through common
identiﬁcation, not only around a business project but also a political
one. As entrepreneurs and their businesses became more embedded
within the settlement contexts, these diaspora based resources were
increasingly complemented by other forms of business support drawn
from outside of the diaspora. The intertwining of the entrepreneurs’
businesses and political activities served to produce a set of transna-
tional human, social, cultural and ﬁnancial resources, which were
supportive of Kurdish diaspora politicisation processes extending across
national borders and into homeland areas.
5.3. Opportunity framework across settlement and homeland contexts
The ﬁnal element identiﬁed from the interview data crucial to un-
derstanding how the entrepreneur's had developed their politicised
business ventures, was the evolving opportunity framework for action
apparent across settlement and homeland spaces. In this respect, fun-
damental to all the ventures development was the rapid advance in
information and communication technologies, which enabled transna-
tional operation. For some, such as Zana's German based internet TV
venture with Turkey as its major market, these technologies were at the
centre of the business model, whereas for others, they played a key role
in enabling routine operation across diaspora and homeland commu-
nities, thus extending the markets, scope and ﬁnancial viability of these
business activities.
The varying political and economic conditions within places of
settlement were particularly crucial to understanding the evolution of
these Kurdish diaspora business activities. The prevailing liberal po-
licies of Western countries in relation to multiculturalism, citizen's
rights and press freedom, permitted Kurdish communities to (re)
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produce Kurdish culture, language and news coverage away from the
coercive state policies of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Entrepreneurs
were able to accumulate economic resources too, even though their
settlement communities were often socially marginalised, and in some
cases subjected to political interventions in response to security fears.
Although there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the speciﬁcities of host
states' policy environments, dominant liberal-democratic traditions
meant business ventures enjoyed a commitment to press freedom not
available in homeland areas:
I do not have a fear that the state will shut down our newspaper in
the UK. Moreover, journalists often censor themselves in Turkey out
of fear or threat from the state, security forces, judiciary or politi-
cians. But If I write my article or news I do not need to self-censor
myself in the UK. I follow the journalistic ethic and professional
code of journalism. So, I can write freely here (Baran, UK based
newspaper publisher).
The Swedish case serves to exemplify how the particularities of host
contexts enabled politicised diaspora venture development. Swedish
multicultural policies of the 1970s supported the reproduction of ethnic
culture (Cederberg & Anthias, 2006), which saw the promotion of
Kurdish culture and the teaching of the Kurdish language in Swedish
schools actively encouraged. This led to the creation of a Kurdish lin-
guistic elite in Sweden who became inﬂuential in the creation of a
number of transnational media production and publishing ventures in
response to growing market opportunities. The expansion in the size
and number of Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe, and elsewhere
(e.g. US, Canada, Australia), along with a growing sense of Kurdish
homeland identity, provided emerging markets for news, media and
cultural businesses, initially in settlement countries and subsequently
within homeland regions. As Azad, who initially worked as a teacher on
arrival in Sweden, explained with regard to the start-up of his business
in Sweden in 1987:
“I noticed that there was a growing demand for books in the Kurdish
language. To meet this need, I established both a printing house and a
publishing house …. Kurdish children were learning their mother tongue
at the Swedish Schools, but there were no Kurdish children's books to
teach the Kurdish language.”
The broadening of markets in settlement states has provided a fur-
ther opportunity for the development of a number of the en-
trepreneurial media and publishing ventures. Generational change and
evolving identities related to diaspora and settlement contexts, along
with a political motivation to engage more widely across nationalities
and generations to avoid the production of a narrow and inward
looking ethnic Kurdish identity, has created new market opportunities.
This was apparent in both Zana's TV and internet based newspaper
ventures, launched in Germany in 2017, which from the outset aimed to
serve both Kurdish and Turkish markets, and Sanar's market strategy for
his magazine launched in 2015, to publish in both the Kurdish and
German languages, which, as previously noted, has attracted non-
Kurdish advertisers.
Market opportunities for media and publishing products and ser-
vices have grown in homeland areas too. However, here market and
political conditions have remained volatile, not least as a consequence
of ongoing regional conﬂicts. As a result, political relations between
state authorities and Kurdish diaspora communities have experienced
periods of improvement and deterioration, acting to constrain devel-
opment opportunities. Both Azad and Adar took advantage of a period
of improved Turkish state-Kurdish relations between 2009 and 2015 to
develop their businesses within Kurdistan-Turkey. However, the sub-
sequent deterioration in relations made these businesses diﬃcult to
operate, and the bookstore opened by Adar in Kurdistan-Turkey was
eventually forced to close following persecution by Turkish military
forces. In Kurdistan-Iraq, the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state
provided new business and political opportunities, although these have
been limited by subsequent conﬂict in the broader region. Shwan's
English speech radio venture, started in 2009, and Solin's feminist
journal, both responded to the opportunities provided by a period of
greater political stability and pluralism in this homeland region. In
these cases, increased political diversity and liberalism, combined with
the growth of return migrants and international workers and increased
openness to Western ideas and cultures among young people and
women, combined to provide new prospects for transnational diaspora
media and publishing businesses, both in terms of a proﬁtable business
operation and to contribute to shaping homeland political develop-
ment.
6. Discussion and conclusions
To advance current conceptualisation of diaspora politics a fuller
understanding of the role of non-state actors, alongside that of state
actors and institutions, is required in order to develop a dynamic un-
derstanding of governance rooted in diverse social relationships and
avoid an over theorisation of the role of the state. Diaspora en-
trepreneurs are one such key non-state actor. Yet to date the political
dimension of their business activity and its relationship to diaspora
identity has been largely ignored within the entrepreneurship litera-
ture. Through advancing the distinctive notion of politicised diaspora
entrepreneurship, this paper focuses attention upon both the economic
and political actions of these entrepreneurs, in order to illuminate the
varied ways in which business venture activity and politicised en-
gagement are realised and intertwined. In so doing the paper challenges
existing limited conceptualisations of diaspora entrepreneurship, which
have largely failed to understand such venture activity in relation to
diaspora as a processual social phenomena, to focus upon the central
relationship between the (re)production of collective diaspora identities
and mobilisation, and entrepreneurial practice.
Study of the politics of diasporas requires bringing together terri-
torial based theorisations of space with more relational ones (Davis,
2017). Analysis of the practice of politicised diaspora entrepreneurial
activities illustrates the manner in which evolving politicised identities
are translated into individual and collective actions that are in some
respects deterritorialized, yet also simultaneously rooted in particular,
places, neighbourhoods and territories. The ﬁndings of this study de-
monstrate entrepreneurial practice embedded within the particularities
of a host-homeland context; one of a stateless and conﬂict generated
diaspora. Here, entrepreneurs drawn from a well-educated politicised
class have developed business ventures in the media, publishing and
communication industries, which have contributed to the articulation
of Kurdish identity and its political mobilisation. This context of sta-
telessness and conﬂict provides few, if any, possibilities for homeland
return, Critically non-state actors living outside of homeland areas have
acted as the strongest drivers of the political ideal of Kurdistan. En-
trepreneurs operating through media and communication ventures play
a particularly important role in developing diaspora culture, language,
history and political thinking that is fundamental to the production and
mobilisation of a collective diaspora consciousness and identity within
Kurdish settlement communities and homeland areas.
Whilst recognising the particularities of the diaspora and sectoral
context which inform the ﬁndings of this study, forms of politicised
diaspora entrepreneurship are embedded in all diaspora contexts, albeit
varying greatly in extent, nature and signiﬁcance. In recognising poli-
ticised diaspora entrepreneurship as a context-dependent phenomenon,
this notion provides a lens through which to examine the diﬀerent
mechanisms by which venturing activities are actively involved in the
ongoing political construction of diaspora identities and the mobilisa-
tion and engagement of diaspora communities across diﬀerent diaspora
contexts and economic sectors. These entrepreneurial activities and
their associated institutional forms are central to achieving a fuller
understanding of the modes, conditions and causal mechanisms of
diaspora politicisation as realised across host and homeland areas.
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Operating in a spatially uneven manner across the host-homeland
nexus, they reﬂect not only the particular histories and experiences of
displacement and conﬂict of entrepreneurial actors and the diaspora
communities within which they are embedded, but also their evolving
sense of belonging to places of settlement and the changing political
conditions within homeland areas.
Given the absence of existing study of politicised forms of diaspora
entrepreneurship there is considerable scope to develop the ﬁndings
here concerning the interaction between an entrepreneurs politicised
identity, evolving opportunity frameworks and the availability of ap-
propriate resources operating across the host-homeland nexus. Further
comparative research across conﬂict and non-conﬂict generated dia-
spora contexts, those with and without homeland states, and the full
range of economic sectors within which diaspora entrepreneurs op-
erate, has the potential to further develop understanding in this ﬁeld.
Empirical research of this type is challenging and raises diﬃcult
ethical issues. Yet study here has the potential to provide further in-
sights into political and cultural activism through which diaspora en-
trepreneurs pursue particularistic claims and political agendas. These
political agendas are in reality highly diverse, ranging from those re-
inforcing the hegemony of neo-liberal and existing state systems to
those advocating more radical and extreme positions. Improved un-
derstanding here has signiﬁcant implications for existing policy
thinking, particularly in relation to politically unstable homeland areas
and places of settlement. There is considerable policy and practical
experience of seeking to use diasporas as positive agents of change in
homeland territories (Horst et al., 2010). Yet evidence from existing
diaspora studies illustrates how diaspora interventions can sometimes
be conﬂict sustaining rather than conﬂict resolving. Certain forms of
politicised diaspora entrepreneurship might provide a policy me-
chanism to promote moderate and progressive forms of political en-
gagement. Yet such interventions need to be informed by a con-
textualised understanding of the embeddedness of entrepreneurial
actions within the particularities of settlement and homeland places,
state territories and transnational spaces, which is too often currently
lacking.
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